Actions to Quiet Title in Pennsylvania

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Overview

Generally, an action to quiet title is designed to determine a dispute over the title to real estate of which the plaintiff is in possession;[1] conversely, if the defendant is in possession of the subject property, an action to quiet title ordinarily is barred, because an action of ejectment is the proper remedy.[2]

The prior collection of statutes concerning clouds on title have been consolidated into the action to quiet title which provides a full and complete remedy for the removal of every type of cloud on a title to real estate.[3]

Underwriting

  • If an adverse quiet title action and/or lis pendens is showing in title, the action must be dismissed or a final adjudication in favor of the owner of the Property entered and all appeals exhausted.
  • If an owner or proposed insured will be relying on a quiet title action to establish title, the final Order must be recorded with the Recorder of Deeds of the Property’s County and all appeals exhausted or expired.

Sources

Actions to quiet title are governed by Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1061-1068.

Generally, the action to quiet title follows the general civil action, except where modified by the Rules.[4]

Actions to quiet title can be brought for the grounds listed in Rule 1061(b):

  1. to compel an adverse party to commence an action of ejectment;
  2. where an action of ejectment will not lie, to determine any right, lien, title or interest in the land or determine the validity or discharge of any document, obligation or deed affecting any right, lien, title or interest in land;
  3. to compel an adverse party to file, record, cancel, surrender or satisfy of record, or admit the validity, invalidity or discharge of, any document, obligation or deed affecting any right, lien, title or interest in land; or
  4. to obtain possession of land sold at a judicial or tax sale.


An action to quiet title must be commenced by filing a Complaint, and cannot be commenced by Petition, or filing a Writ of Summons.[5]

Further Information

An out-of-possession plaintiff may not maintain an action to quiet title because it constitutes an enlargement of that party's substantive rights as defined by statute, thus exceeds the court's jurisdiction to proceed.[6]

There is no precise definition of what constitutes "possession" of real property for purposes of determining whether a plaintiff is out of possession and thus not entitled to maintain an action to quiet title; a determination of possession is dependent upon the facts of each case, and to a large extent upon the character of the land in question. In general, "actual possession of land" means dominion over the property; it is not the equivalent of occupancy.[7]

There are situations, however, where an action to quiet title may be brought by a plaintiff not in possession, such as where the plaintiff is only an equitable owner of the property and has no present right to possession.[8] In addition, an action to quiet title can be utilized by a lessor against a lessee who is in actual possession under a written lease.[9] An action to quiet title, therefore, may be authorized regardless of whether the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property.[10]

Inalienable Property Act

Related to quiet title actions, the Inalienable Property Act, part of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 8301-8306, grants authority to the Courts to dispose of real property where the owners may be unable or unavailable to convey.

Cross-Reference

Lis Pendens in Pennsylvania


  1. Moore v. Duran, 455 Pa. Super. 124, 687 A.2d 822 (1996); Seven Springs Farm, Inc. v. King, 235 Pa. Super. 450, 344 A.2d 641 (1975).

  2. Brennan v. Shore Bros., 380 Pa. 283, 110 A.2d 401 (1955); Bruker v. Burgess and Town Council of Borough of Carlisle, 376 Pa. 330, 102 A.2d 418 (1954); Moore v. Duran, 455 Pa. Super. 124, 687 A.2d 822 (1996); Versailles Tp. Authority of Allegheny County v. City of McKeesport, 171 Pa. Super. 377, 90 A.2d 581 (1952).

  3. Valente v. Northampton Nat. Bank of Easton, 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 623, 1976 WL 459 (C.P. 1976); Roskwitalski v. Reiss, 338 Pa. Super. 85, 487 A.2d 864 (1985).

  4. See Rule 1061(a).

  5. See Rule 1063.

  6. Moore v. Duran, 455 Pa. Super. 124, 687 A.2d 822 (1996); Plauchak v. Boling, 439 Pa. Super. 156, 653 A.2d 671 (1995)

  7. Moore v. Duran, 455 Pa. Super. 124, 687 A.2d 822 (1996).

  8. City of Philadelphia to Use of Eastern Asphalt Co. v. Kelly, 78 Pa. D. & C. 445, 1952 WL 4255 (C.P. 1952); Brennan v. Shore Bros., 380 Pa. 283, 110 A.2d 401 (1955).

  9. Deaven v. School Dist. of West Hanover Tp., 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 293, 1955 WL 5061 (C.P. 1955); Brennan v. Shore Bros., 380 Pa. 283, 110 A.2d 401 (1955).

  10. McCullough v. Main Line Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 75 Pa. D. & C.2d 442, 1976 WL 17458 (C.P. 1976); Hanson v. Berenfield, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 361, 1961 WL 6394 (C.P. 1961).